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Hung-mao Tien *
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, more China scholars have looked to factions in
analyzing the elites, the national policy-making, and the overall pattern of Chinese political behavior. The sudden spurt of interest in
Chinese political groups has been in part influenced by the excellent
pioneer works of William Whitson and Andrew J. Nathan.• Political events in China since the 1960s have also brought about growing
awareness that group analysis can indeed broaden our knowledge of
China's complex political process. During the Cultural Revolution
of 1966-1976, party institutions were in virtual paralysis, while overall institutionalized policy-making and implementation processes
were eclipsed in a state of dysfunction or even chaos. Politics involving the succession to Mao Zedong induced various political groups
to juggle for power in an apparent effort to protect their stakes in the
outcome.
A survey of recent scholarly writings reveals widespread acknowledgement of the existence of political groups. These writings
cover the period from approximately 1969 (the 9th party congress) to
1981, and vary in reference to time span and arenas of politics and
policy classification. The following summaries represent a spectrum
of existing scholarly classifications of political groups in China:
Authors
Michael Oksenberg 2

Category of Groups
Military fundamentalists: Qi
Benyu, Guan Feng
Radical conservatives: Mao
Zedong
Eclectic modernizers: Zhou

Political
or Policy Arena
Foreign policy

--------~

--~

• I want to thank Professors Michel Oksenberg, Ramon Myers, and Pi-chao Chen
for their valuable comments on the draft of this article.
I. William Whitson with Huang Chen-hsia, The Chinese High Command: A History
of Chinese Military Politics, New York: Praeger, 1973: Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 53 (January-March 1973), pp.
34-66.
2. Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum,"
ProblemsofCommunism, Vol. 23, No.3 (March/Aprill974), pp. 2-12.
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Lieberthal 3

-

I

II

Ting Wang4

Harry Harding 5

Lucian Pye 6

Tony Saich7

Dorothy J. Solinger 8

Enlai, Deng Xiaoping
Westernized Chinese: (few
in hiding)
Peking group: Zhou, Li
Xiannian
Shanghai group: Zhang, Yao
Wenyuan, et al.
Military group: PLA
commanders, Chen Xilian
Westernizers: Zhou, Deng
Eclectics: Mao, Hua
Radicals: "Gang of Four"
Bureaucratic clique: Li, Yu
Qiuli
Jiang Qing clique
Military faction: Lin Biao,
Fourth Field Army
Moderate faction: Zhou,
Deng
Leftist faction: Zhang
Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, et al.
Whatever faction: Hua
Guofeng, et al.
Opposition faction: Y e
Jianying
Restoration faction: Deng,
Hu Yaobang
Practice faction: Deng, Hu
Whatever faction: Hua,
Wang Dongxing
Adjusters: Chen Yun, Yao
Yilin
Reformers: Zhao Ziyang,

National powers

Modernization
and succession
National political
powers
Overall national
program

Evaluation of
Mao and Maoism
Economic modernization

3. Kenneth Lieberthal, "The Internal Political Scene," Problems o.f Communism,
Vol. 24, No. 3 (May/June 1975), pp. 5-6; and also "Modernization and Succession
Politics in China," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 32 (Fall 1978), pp. 239-240.
4. Ting Wang, "Trends in China: Leadership Realignment," Problems if
Communism, Vol. 26, No.4 (July/August 1977), p. 3.
5. Harry Harding, Organizing China, The Problem o/ Bureaucracy /949-1976,
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1981, pp. 298-323.
6. Lucian Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics, Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc. 1981, pp. 13-25.
7. Tony Saich, China: Politics and Government, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981,
p. 65.
8. Dorothy J. Solinger, "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of
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Wang Shu-shin9

Dorothy Grouse
Fontana 10

Wan Li
Conservers: Yu, Kang Shien
Reformists: Deng
Conservatives: Ye
Leftists: Hua
Petroleum faction: Li, Yu
Economic adjustment
faction: Chen Yun
Whateverists: Hua

Power alignment
and policy
differences

Power alignment

Dengists: Zhao, Chen, Deng
Petroleum: Yu
Southern military-provincial coalition: Wei
Guoqing, Xu Shiyou

A number of these writings (e.g., Oksenberg, Saich, Lieberthal, Solinger) specify the particular political or policy arena of their categorization of groups, while others speak more generally. Some writers,
like Harding and Lieberthal, confine their references to the period
which begins prior to the death of Mao and concludes with the subsequent arrest of the Gang of Four in the fall of 1976. Most writers
deal with the 1970s, particularly the years since 1977.
The adoption of group labels, as evident above, attests to the
lack of uniformity in group categorization. Thus, several key political actors have been placed in apparently contradictory groupings.
For instance, Lieberthal refers to Mao and Hua as eclectics, and
Zhou and Deng are classified as westernizers. Oksenberg, on the
other hand, describes Zhou and Deng as eclectic modernizers, but
depicts westernized Chinese as "few and hiding." Fontana associates Zhao and Chen Yun with Deng, while Solinger assigns Chen
and Zhao to different groupings. Part of the reason for such scholarly inconsistency may be explained by the fact that data on informal groups is meager and extremely unreliable. As John Bryan
Starr asserts, "Since personal relations are, almost by definition, not
open to public scrutiny, the identification of cliques and their memberships becomes particularly problematic."'' In addition to the
problems in identifying group membership as well as in delineating
Policymaking: Reform, Readjustment and the Opposition, Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No.
12 (December 1982), pp. 1242-1245.
9. Shu-shin Wang, "Hu Yaobang: New Chairman of the Chinese Communist
Party," Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 9 (September 1982), p. 817.
10. Dorothy Crouse Fontana, "Background to the Fall of Hua Guofeng," Asian
Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 3 (March 1983), pp. 240-249.
II. John Bryan Starr, "From the lOth Party Congress to the Premiership of Hua
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their functional boundaries and institutional bases, the scholarly
community remains unable to identify membership of Chinese political groups beyond a handful of individuals active on the national
level.
What causes the formation of political groups, in both national
and local scenes, remains an unsettled issue. Before reliable empirical data become more available, any attempt to theorize about Chinese group phenomena would remain hypothetical at best. In all
likelihood, a multiplicity of factors (i.e., the perspectives of policy
orientation, cultural characteristics, informal social relationships, institutional affiliation, territorial affinity and perceived self-interest)
will probably continue to determine the formation of groups. One
could also argue that the dominance of group behaviors in recent
Chinese politics simply reflects the state of China's political development at a time when the institutionalization of political life remains
infantile, subject to the impacts of cyclically volatile political currents. Pye's ambitious theory that asserts factionalism is a manifestation of Chinese psycho-cultural behaviors, and that bureaucratic
interests are less likely in China than in most places with different
political systems to become "pivotal points of political conflicts and
alliances" is insightful heuristically; however, its validity in explaining the pecularity of Chinese political style has not been fully
tested. 12
In spite of the difficulties of precisely identifying membership in
various political groups, adopting a group approach to the analysis
of Chinese political events during the period from the 11th Central
Committee (CC) Third Plenum (December 1978) to the 12th Party
Congress (September 1982) remains useful. As subsequent discussion will reveal, conflicts between political groups in ideology, policy, and power bases are characteristic of China's elite politics during
that period.
The Third Plenum is now officially proclaimed to be the turning
point of the post-Mao Zedong era, characterized by the emergence
of a new leadership committed to a course of development fundamentaUy different from the past. 13 Given all of the sequence of
Kuo-feng: The Significance of the Colour of the Cat," The China Quarterly, No. 67
(September 1976), p. 480.
12. Pye, supra note 6, p. 82.
13. Michel Oksenberg and Richard Bush's recent study also describes it as the "crucial watershed of the Post-Mao era." See Oksenberg and Bush, "China's Political Evolution: 1972-1982," Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXI, No.5 (August/September 1982),
p. 8.
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events that followed, the PRC's official claim is well founded. In
retrospect the years since mid-1978 have indeed witnessed the steady
rise of a powerful elite group surrounding Deng Xiaoping, Chen
Yun, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, at the expense of those associated with Maosim, the Gang of Four, and Lin Biao. The process of
power transfer began in the Third Plenum and was practically completed by the time the 12th Party Congress was held.
This essay seeks to analyze: 1) the evolution of the new power
alignment evident since the Third Plenum; 2) the network of power
bases of this leadership group; 3) the strategy adopted in the apparent struggle for powers between these newly emerged power elites
and their opponents; and 4) changes in policy and institutions, particularly in the Party, that were part of the struggle and that helped
shape the sequence of developments in the PRC's political system. It
should be pointed out that events since 1978 had their twists and
turns: there were occasional setbacks for the finally dominant
Dengist group. Even today there remain questions concerning the
extent to which this group can control China's political situation
without encountering further political turmoil ahead. However, the
general pattern of political development in the last five years
strongly suggests that Deng's principal opponents will have little
chance of altering the r.urrent power alignment and policy direction
in the foreseeable future.
Group Politics Since the Third Plenum
The Deng-Hu group had virtually dominated the centers of
PRC's national power by the time the 12th Party Congress was held
in September 1982. They controlled the gateways to the arenas of
power in the Party, the government, and the military. The process
by which they acquired such power can be clarified by tracing the
sequence of political t=vents since the 11th CC's Third Plenum.
The 11th CC held seven plenary sessions. Several Central
Work Conferences were also convened. The Third Plenum and the
Central Work Conference preceding it-both held in December
1978-were the critical meetings most responsible for altering direction of CCP line, institutional development, and leadership changes.
In addition, the Fourth Plenum (September 1979), Fifth Plenum
(February 1980), Sixth Plenum (June 1981) and the Central Work
Conferences in April 1979, December 1980, an December 1981, also
brought about important decisions and changes that elaborated, enriched, modified, or implemented the emerging new line. The ultimate result was a wholesale change of leaders and policy line as well
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as adoption of the new Party Constitution at the 12th Party Congress. In line with the sequence of these political developments a
new PRC constitution was adopted on December 4, 1982 by the
Fifth National People's Congress.
Events Prior to the Third Plenum
The Third Plenum of the 11th CC was the turning point for the
reemerging political fortunes of Deng, Hu, Chen Yun, ~nd their rehabilitated cadres. The CC officially made the decisions to endorse
their views, thus strengthening their formal authority. To paraphrase Lowell Dittmar's words, the informal network of Deng's
political base was translated more effectively into positions of formal
power. 14 But it would be wrong to assume that the Third Plenum
decisions were reached in an atmosphere of a free-for-all democratic
contest; nor should one assume that the plenary session resembled
anything like a great parliamentary debate. On the contrary, decisions might have been made almost in their entirety in the Central
Work Conference prior to the plenum session.
For two years before the conference and plenum were held, the
central leadership had been preoccupied with the issues of the Gang
of Four and the implementation of the earlier version of the Four
Modernizations initiated by Zhou Enlai and later enunciated by
Hua Guofeng. Those who were responsible for the arrest of the
Gang of Four and their proteges were anxious to reconstruct a national leadership surrounding Hua, Ye, and Li Xiannian. Differences on policy matters and power considerations among them and
those already rehabilitated did not surface to become politically divisive. Their common denominator lay in concerted efforts against the
Gang of Four forces and radical policies. However, by 1977, 77
members of the CC, presumably the Gang's radical followers, were
purged or suspended. 15
The situation began to change once Deng was rehabilitated for
the second time in the spring of 1977. 16 Deng's rehabilitation was
14. Lowell Dittmer, "Bases of power in Chinese politics: A Theory and An Analysis
of the Fall of 'Gang of Four' " World Politics, Vol. XXXI, No. I (October 1978), pp. 2833.

15. Fifty-one of them belonged to the worker-peasant backgrounds, while fourteen
were described as civilian cadres and twelve as PLA officers. See Fontana, supra note 10,
p. 249.
16. Kenneth Lieberthal argues that Hua and Deng struck a deal in writing, according
to which Deng admitted personal errors and promised to support Hua as the national
leader. See his "Modernization and Succession Politics in China," supra note 3, p. 246.
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subsequently made official at the Third Plenum of the lOth CC in
July that year. Several of Deng's close associates who had been
purged with him for the second time following the 1976 Tienanmen
Incident also reappeared. They included, for example, Hu Yaobang,
Hu Qiaomu and Xi Zhongxun. Immediately upon their return to
active political life, they began to rebuild political bases. Their aggressive efforts soon yielded results. The initial targets were to control the Party center while simultaneously nurturing support in the
provinces to undermine the institutional and territorial bases of Hua,
Wang Dongxing, and others. The process of competition for pivotal
offices can be described simply as a power struggle.
Deng may have been consulted in Hua's preparation for the
"Draft Outline of the Ten Year Plan for the National Economy,"
which the then Premier Hua officially presented to the First Session
of the Fifth NPC (Feb. 26-March 5) in 1978. But his principal concerns at this time did not involve economic policy issues. He appeared to be more preoccupied with penetrating the ranks of the
PLA (he was Chief of General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission), controlling the Party center, manipulating the
change of leaders in the provinces and military regions, and preparing an ideological rationale for launching his political and policy offensives. In short, he and his associates focused on building bases
for expanding their political powers.
Upon rehabilitation, Hu Yaobang immediately turned his attention to capturing the Party's bureaucratic headquarters, the most important of which were the CC's General Office (Zhongyang
bangongting), the Organization Department, and the Propaganda
Department. Control of these Party units would be a critical step
toward a faster rehabilitation of the purged cadres, who would be
likely supporters. Such steps would subsequently facilitate the return of Deng-Hu's friends and followers to important Party posts in
the provinces and municipalities. They would then be able to shape
the direction of Party-controlled public communications. If the rehabilitated cadres could be placed in influential positions in the cities, the provinces, and the various production and services units,
they would inevitably join the Deng force to form a network of support for Deng's leadership and policy lines. The Party's central bureaucratic offices were thus crucial instruments needed for the
capture and restoration of the Party powers.
But these Party units were closely guarded by Hua and Wang
Dongxing. Since the Central Secretariat was abolished during the
Cultural Revolution, the CC General Office had taken over many of

10
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the Secretariat functions. Wang Dongxing had been hand-picked by
Mao to replace Yang Shangkun as the office director. In 1969 when
the Ninth Party Congress did away with the Central Cultural
Revolution Group, the General Office's authority expanded. It controlled sensitive personnel archives and handled confidential communications and high-level documentsY Under Wang's control the
office established three sections to review cases of high-level officials
in the Party, government, and PLA who had been purged. 18 As subsequent events have revealed, they blocked the rehabilitation of
many purged cadres.
The initial penetration into the office came when Hu Yaobang
was appointed Deputy Director of the General Office at the Tenth
CC's Third Plenum, serving ostensibly under Wang Dongxing. In
October 1977 he replaced the radical Guo Yufeng to become Head
of Organization Department. Acting in that capacity, Hu reportedly
corrected many "erroneous cases" and recommended the rehabilitation of the "victims." Major rehabilitation cases announced at the
11th CC's Third Plenum may have been handled by him. Hu's later
appointment in December that year as Vice-President of the Central
Party School (Hua was President and Wang the First Vice-President)
also put him in an apparent collision course with Hua and Wang. In
spite of such initial efforts, the Hua-Wang force retained the upper
hand in the balance of powers in these units. The Propaganda Department was still headed by Zhang Pinghua, a Hua protege who
had previously served as the First Party Secretary of Hunan. Deng's
man Zhu Muzhi was brought in as a number two to counter Zhang's
authority. As the battle line in group rivalries was being drawn in
the Party's bureaucratic headquarters, Hu Qiaomu took over the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in 1978. He revitalized that
institution and used it as a base to develop economic theories and to
train cadres specialized in them. From the Academy he prepared,
for Deng's use, some important ideological documents and theories
on socialist economy which were to become immensely important
later on. In July 1978 he published the important essay, "Act in Accordance with Economic Laws, Step Up the Four Modernizations,"
in which he proposed market socialism in order to expand economic
productive capacity at a higher level of efficiency and productivity. 19
17. Shu-shin Wang, supra note 9, p. 807.
18. Luo Bing, "Fanshipai shi shi ji" (An account of the Whateverist Faction's loss of
power base), Zheng Ming, No. 16 (February 1979), pp. 5-8.
19. A. Doak Barnett, China's Economy in Global Perspective, Washinton, D.C.: The
Brookings Institution, 1981, p. 37.
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The essay had immediate impact on the Third Plenum when the issues related to socialist modernization were being discussed.
Taking advantage of the growing number of rehabilitated victims of the Cultural Revolution, the Deng-Hu group quickly
manipulated their appointments to the provincial and local leadership positions. By 1979, Guangdong alone witnessed the return of
over 40,000 such people to basic level cadre positions. 20 Initially
many were reinstalled in the revolutionary committees, schools, and
enterprises. Gradually they stepped into the more pivotal positions
in the Party. In 1978 their impact began to reach many provincial
and municipal level Party Committees. During 1977-78, provincial
Party committees reportedly had been reorganized in Guangdong,
Shanxi, Henan, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Ningxia, Liaoning,
Hunan, Hubei, Tibet, Guangxi, Guizhou, Shanghai, Tianjin and
Beijing. 21 Changes of military commanders and political commissars also took place in several regions and districts. Thus by the time
the Central Work Conference was convened in late 1978, supporters
of Deng and Hu had controlled or formed a formidable power bloc
in at least half of China's military regions, military districts, provincial and municipal revolutionary committees, and Party committees,
severely undermining the power bases of the central political force
centered around Hua, Ye and Li. They were clearly on the verge of
crippling whatever powers were left in the hands of the previous supporters of the Gang of Four. Deng's proteges were rapidly consolidating Party and/or military powers in the critical locations of
Guangdong (Xi Zhongxun), Hubei (Chen Pixian), Henan (Duan
Junyi), Shanghai (Su Zhenhua, Peng Chong), Beijing (Qin Jiwei),
Tianjin (Chen Weida), Shaanxi (Ma Wenrui), Sichuan (Zhao
Ziyang) and Liaoning (Ren Zhongyi). When leading cadres of the
Party, PLA, and government headquarters, and of the military regions, provinces and municipalities were all summoned for the work
conference, it did not come as a surprise that majority sentiments
leaned toward the support of emerging powerful political force centered around the personality of Deng Xiaoping.

THE THIRD PLENUM
At the Third Plenum (December 18-23, 1978) Hua Guofeng
20. Fontana, supra note 10, p. 249.
21. Zhonggong Nianbao (Yearbook in Chinese Communism), Taipei: Zhonggong
Yanjiu Zazhishe, 1979, pp. II 2-4; also Lieberthal, "Modernization and Succession. . . "
supra note 3, p. 253.
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presented a Politburo decision to stop the on-going mass campaigns
against Lin Biao and the Gang of Four, and to shift the Party and
national focus on the modernization plan. It was duly endorsed in
the opening minutes of the session. He urged the Party to stress from
then on the notion of collective leadership and put less emphasis on
the individual cult. This was probably a response to the rumored
criticism directed against him in the preceding work conference.
The plenum discussed the importance of implementing Mao's more
conservative speeches-"On the Ten Major Relations," "On the
Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People," and "The
60-Point Method ofWork"-which had been sidetracked since 1958
in favor of the Chairman's more radical directives. These three documents were to become the segment of Mao Zedong Thought which
the Deng-Hu group would be willing to live with.
The plenum accomplished three important tasks. 22 It elected
members to the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Central
Commission for Inspecting Discipline. It approved a number of policy decisions and set forth the new ideological tone desired by the
Deng-Hu group. It reversed verdicts on most of the Party's important political cases since the Great Leap Forward. All of these decisions have had profound consequences in regard to the political
development that followed. They realigned the central and later,
provincial-regional power distribution, shifted the direction of party
lines, and laid the policy foundation for institutional changes. Outcomes of the plenum are spelled out as follows:
A. Elections: Four important allies of Deng-Chen Yun,
Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen-were added to the
Politburo. Chen Yun also joined its Standing Committee, and became a Vice-Chairman of the Party. Nine rehabilitated cadresHuang Kecheng, Song Renqiong, Hu Qiaomu, Xi Zhongxun, Wang
Renzhong, Chen Zhaidao, Han Kuang, and Zhu Hui-became new
members of the Central Committee. In the subsequent years, most
of these people were to play crucial roles in expanding the power
bases of Deng-Hu leadership.
In addition, Hu Y aobang was appointed to the newly restored
post of the CC Secretary General (bishuzhang)-the same title Deng
held during 1954-56 prior to assuming the more powerful title of
General Secretary (zong shuji) in 1956. Hu subsequently used that
22. The following accounts are based on information provided in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereinafter cited as FBIS). People's Republic of China, Dec.
26, 1978, pp. El-E24, and December 27, 1978, pp. El-E20.
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position to salvage the CC General Office from Wang Dongxing's
control and to rebuild the Party central bureaucracy by reviving the
Central Secretariat. As Secretary General he also directed the Party
center's daily work, particularly in regard with personnel changes,
quickened the pace of rehabilitating Cultural Revolution victims,
and controlled the agenda of Party meetings. In retrospect, Deng
clearly wanted Hu to be the pivotal man in rebuilding the Party apparatus, and to use that as the principal political base to control
Party powers.
B. Party Lines and Policy Decisions: PRC leaders and media
today have made frequent reference to the Third Plenum Lines, implying that the Party lines advocated by Deng and others were officially put forward at the Third Plenum. Jurgen Domes defines
"Line [in the PRC politics as] a set of basic policies in all major areas
of political decision-making, i.e., a comprehensive platform developed on the basis of long-term strategies as well as intermediate
range tactical considerations." 23 He identifies the following five
realms of line application: 1) ideological principles; 2) international
politics; 3) economic development; 4) social development; 5) education and culture. 24 The Third Plenum did not deal with all of these
topics. On the most important question of ideological principles,
there was no definitive resolution. Given the scanty evidence available, policy lines were discussed in the plenum, but only some areas
of discussion resulted in concrete resolution.
In the discussion of major political questions arising from PRC
history, Deng apparently introduced the notion that these questions
must be settled in accordance with the principle which Mao Zedong
sometimes advocated, e.g., "Seeking Truth from Facts and Correcting Mistakes Whenever Discovered." 25 Statements by the CC
afterward only went so far as to say that the plenum "puts a high
evaluation on the discussion of whether practice is the sole criterion
for testing truth." 26 The wordings suggest that this Dengist ideological canon was not officially adopted in resolution form. Such an ambiguous statement reveals the existence of substantial opposition in
the plenum.
23. Jurgen Domes, "1976-82: Evolution of a New CCP Line?" in Chang King-yuh
(ed), The Emerging Teng System: Orientation, Po/ici.?s, and Implications, Vol. II, Taipei:
Institute of International Relations, 1982, pp. 1-2.
24. Ibtd.
25. FBIS., December 26, supra note 22, pp. EIO.
26. Ibid., p. Ell.
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The session did adopt the "Regulations on the Work in the Rural People's Communes" in order to reform agricultural practice in
the commune system and to increase production. It also discussed
the draft copy of the document on "Some Questions Concerning the
Acceleration of Agricultural Development." It approved higher
purchase prices for grain and other agricultural produce. Prices in
farm machinery, chemical fertilizer, insecticides, plastics, etc. were
also reduced in order to cut down agricultural costs. The State
Council was instructed to adopt an implementation plan according
to these changes. It was decided that these two documents were to
be forwarded to provinces and municipalities for study and implementation on trial basis. Questions with regard to raising agricultural production seemed to involve a great deal of detailed
discussion.

C Reversal of verdicts in past political cases: Under the influence of Deng and Chen Yun, the plenum officially repudiated
charges against the victims of many previous purges. In particular, it
corrected the April 5, 1976 "Tiananmen Incidents," calling them
"revolutionary actions." It referred to the cases involving Peng
Dehuai, Tao Zhu, Bo Yibo and Yang Shangkun as "erroneous conclusions." It called for rehabilitating victims of these "false charges"
and "frame-ups." In spite of Hua's opening statement that mass
campaigns against the Gang of Four be stopped, the session nonetheless endorsed thorough investigation of the individuals and incidents associated with the Gang of Four "conspiracy to usurp Party
and state powers.'m In short, the CC officially legitimized the rehabilitation policy put forward by the Deng-Chen group. The other
major victims of Mao not mentioned in the statement were Liu
Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, and Lu Dingyi. Liu's case was not settled until
the Fifth Plenum in February 1980. Controversy within the high
Party circle over the Liu case apparently was too profound to be
settled at this time.
But Peng Zhen was rehabilitated on December 23, the day after
the plenum was ended. Many others including Lu Dingyi followed
suit. Many rehabilitated cadres soon resumed important assignments, strengthening political bases of Deng and his close associates
at the Party center. Realignment of powers at the provincial level
proceeded so rapidly that by 1980, twenty-five out of the twenty-nine
provincial First Party Secretaries fell into the hands of rehabilitated
27. Ibid., p. E9.
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cadres. 28 Once those who previously suffered political disgrace
staged their comeback behind the bandwagon of Deng-Hu power
machine, the politics of revenge and restoration quickly took their
toll against the beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution.
In 1979, the power base of Wang Dongxing crumbled to pieces.
Yao Yilin, a noted protege of Chen Yun replaced Wang as Director
of the CC General Office. Feng Wenbin, a senior colleague of Hu
Yaobang in the CYL during the early 1950s, became its Vice-Director, effectively terminating control of the office by Wang and his proteges, Li Xin and Zhang Yaochu. 29 Hu Yaobang himself took over
Zhang Pinghua's position as Head of the CC Propaganda Department and immediately reshuffled the key positions at Hongqi (Red
Flag). Meanwhile, Hu Qiaomu replaced Hua as Director of the
Committee on Mao Zedong Work, a critical position which oversees
the selection and evaluation of Mao's writings for party consumption. The General Office's functions which dealt with personnel files
of the purged senior cadres were turned over to the Organization
Department. Wang Dongxing's "8341" Garrison Troop, responsible
for the security of Zhongnanhai (where top leaders live and work),
was put under the direct command of General Yang Dezhi, a Deng
confident, in the headquarters of the PLA Chief of General Staff.
These moves assured Deng-Hu's virtual control over the Party central bureaucracy at the expense of Hua and Wang. The policy of
rehabilitation and major personnel changes at the Third Plenum
thus had profound implications for the rivalry of powers between
Deng-Hu and Hua-Wang.
MAJOR PARTY DECISIONS BETWEEN THE THIRD
PLENUM AND THE TWELFTH PARTY
CONGRESS
In spite of the apparent political victories at the Third Plenum,
the emerging leadership of Deng, Hu, Zhao, and Chen went through
a series of twists and turns, subject to minor periodic setbacks between 1979 and 1981. Nonetheless, the overall political currents
clearly moved in a direction that favored their leadership and policy
positions. They did, however, meet challenges and resistance.
Neither would one argue that internal policy differences did not exist
within the Deng group. They did, and perhaps still do. But politics
in those years were gradually cast in the form of Deng's group versus
28. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1980, pp. 11-12.
29. Luo Bing, supra note 18, p. 8.
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those who prospered during the turbulent years 1966-76. The most
salient character of such political tension existed between Deng's
group and the "Whateverists" who subscribed to the doctrine,
"Whatever policies Mao had made should be resolutely defended,
whatever instructions Mao had given should be steadily abided
by." 30 Before we discuss this issue in further detail, let us first review
the major events which transpired in the CC Plena and Central
Work Conferences as follows:

CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE-APRIL 1979
The conference focused on problems derived from the ambitious economic modernization packages put together by Hua, Li
Xiannian, Yu Qiuli and other top economic planners associated with
the "Petroleum Clique." It adopted the famous "Eight-Character"
economic policy for the coming three years, that is, readjustment,
reform, consolidation, and standards improvement. Among other
actions, it also set forth the new guidelines to broaden the scope of
autonomy for enterprise management, to permit retention of profits
by enterprise units, to restrict the acquisition of new and large equipment, to practice democratic and scientific management, and to establish responsibility systems for factory managers, chief engineers
and administrative leaders.

THE FOURTH PLENUM, SEPTEMBER 1979
It discussed and endorsed a speech draft to be delivered by Y e
Jianying on October 1 in commemoration of the PRC's Thirtieth
Anniversary celebration. The highlight of the speech stressed the
theme that without Mao Zedong Thought there would have been no
new China; but Maoist thought was not a product of Mao's personal
wisdom alone, rather that of the CCP's collective wisdom. 31 It was
an apparent effort to de-apothesize Mao and Maoism.
In addition, it formally adopted the "Decisions on Some Questions Concerning the Acceleration of Agricultural Development,"
first discussed in the Third Plenum. It ·added twelve rehabilitated
leaders to the CC roster. They included Yang Shangkun, Peng
Zhen, Bo Yibo, Zhou Yang, Lu Dingyi, Jiang Nanxiang. Wang
30. This position was first articulated in publication by the Commentator of Renmin
Ribao, February 7, 1977, p. I. The daily paper's editorial staff was under the control of
Wang Dongxing at that time.
31. Renmin Ribao, October 2, 1979, p. I.
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Dongxing reportedly was compelled to make a self-criticism, a clear
signal of the decline of his political influence.
THE FIFTH PLENUM, FEBRUARY 1980
This was an enlarged session, attended also by scores of second
echelon leaders who were not CC members. The session lasted for
one week, an unusual length for a plenum. It discussed the draft of
the proposed new Party Constitution. Six major resolutions were
passed at the plenum. They were:
1. Elevation of Zhao Ziyang to the Politburo Standing
Committee.
2. Restoration of the CC Central Secretariat; election of Hu
Yaobang as the General Secretary and ten others as Secretaries.
3. Ousting of Wang Dongxing, Wu De, Ji Dengkui and Chen
Xilien from the Politburo.
4. Rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi, describing Liu's case the most
serious frame-up mistake of the PRC history.
5. Adoption of the "Guiding Principles for Inner-Party Political Life," in an effort to restore the Party norms which prevailed at
the time of the Eighth Party Congress in 1956.
6. Erasure from the Constitution of citizen's four rights to
"speak out freely, air one's views fully, hold great debates, and write
big -character posters."
CENTRAL WORK CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1980
The agenda apparently discussed the following six issues:
1. The demotion of Hua Guofeng and other personnel
changes to be followed. Reportedly Deng criticized Hua for his:
personality cult, preventing Deng and Chen Yun from being rehabilitated in 1977, insistence on "Two Whatevers," resisting the principle
of "Seek[ing] Truth from Facts," and mistakes in economic modernization plan. 32 It was decided that Hua relinquished his positions as
Chairman of both the Party and the Military Commission. Hu
Yaobang and Deng Xiaoping would replace him in these two positions. Hua would be demoted to the Party Vice-Chairman.
2. The revised draft of the Party Constitution.
3. The draft of a proposed new PRC Constitution especially
with reference to the issue of restoring the office of PRC President, a
position Liu Shaoqi held when he was purged.
32. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1981, p. 11-2.
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4. The proposed "Decisions Regarding the Party's Several
Historical Questions Since the Funding of the PRC."
5. The newly proposed economic readjustment plan, which
reimposed administrative controls, centralization and unification,
and increasing governmental intervention in the economy. 33
6. The date and agenda for the 12th Party Congress.
THE SIXTH PLENUM, JUNE, 1981
The session was relatively short, from June 27 to June 29. But
the preparatory meetings prior to that were long, lasting eleven days.
Apparently, many of the debates and substantive discussions took
place in the preparatory meetings. The principal actions were:
1. Passing the "Decisions Regarding the Party's Several Historical Questions Since the Founding of the PRC." The document
makes a conclusive evaluation of Mao's role in the PRC history.
2. Officially demoting Hua to Vice-Chairman; Hu was elected
Party Chairman, Deng was made Military Commission Chairman,
and Zhao was elevated to Party Vice-Chairman. Ranking of the
Politburo Standing Committee was set in the order of Hu, Ye, Deng,
Zhao, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and Hua. Hu Yaobang continued on
as the CC General Secretary.
3. Election of Xu Zhongxun as Secretary of the Central
Secretariat.
The Twelfth Party Congress
The Twelfth Party Congress was held in Peking from September 1 to September 11, with 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates attending. In the opening speech Deng Xiaoping declared this to be
the most important meeting held since the Seventh Party Congress in
1945, thereby totally downgrading the rest of the Congresses held
since the founding of the People's Republic. 34 In the speech, Deng
set forth four basic tasks for the nation: 1) to restructure the administration and the economic set-up in order to make the ranks of cadres more revolutionary, of a younger average age, better educated,
and more professionally competent; 2) to build a socialist spiritual
civilization; 3) to strike at criminal activities in economic and other
areas that undermine socialism; and 4) to rectify the Party style of
33. For more details on this plan, see Solinger, supra note 8, p. 1240.
34. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 36 (September 16, 1982), p. 5.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

19

work and consolidate the Party organization on the basis of a careful
study of the new Party Constitution.
The Congress listened to Hu Yaobang's lengthy political report
which contained some 34,000 words. This was the longest political
report ever delivered at the Party Congress in the PRC history. 35
Gordon Bennett and Lowell Dittmer have suggested that steady reduction in length of the political report prior to 1982 signaled the
possible decline of the Party Congress as a forum for decision-making and discussion of major issues. 36 By this yardstick, the Twelfth
Congress could represent a reversal of the previous trend, and could
indicate that the Party Congress is being reinvigorated as an important forum. However, its unwieldy number of delegates would prevent it from becoming an effective decision-making body. The party
machine controlled by Deng and Hu had every reason to dramatize
the importance of this Party Congress. It represented an important
milestone in the rise to power of the Deng-Hu leadership and the
major policies they favor. It also ended a long process of atrocious
political struggles, and began a new era.
The Congress adopted a new Party Constitution with a total of
fifty lengthy articles in ten chapters, almost as long as the 1956 Constitution. As Bennett has pointed out elsewhere, the Party Constitutions adopted at the Ninth and Tenth Congresses were much shorter
than the 1956 Constitution, and gave only slight attention to matters
concerning central and local Party organizations. 37 By comparison,
the new Constitution devotes seven of its ten long chapters to elaborate in detail the scope and structure of activities for the Party organizations. Such an effort adds additional testimony to the new
leadership's emphasis on Party rebuilding. The task of Party rebuilding gathered momentum at the Eleventh CC's Fifth Plenum in
February 1979 when the Central Secretariat was restored; it is now
officially reinstituted in the Constitution. The Party chairmanship
was abolished in favor of a collective leadership formula.
The Congress also elected 348 members (21 0 regulars, 135 alter35. Compared with Liu Shaoqi's 31,000 words in 1956 (Eighth), Lin Biao's 16,000
words in 1969 (Ninth), Wang Hongwen's 6,500 words in 1973 (Tenth), and Hua
Guofeng's 4,300 words in 1977 (Eleventh). For reference see Gordon A. Bennett, China's
Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Congresses, Constitutions and Central Committees: An Institutional Overview and Comparison, University of Texas, Austin: Center for Asian Studies,
Occasional Paper Series, Number I, 1974, p. 5.
36. Ibid. Also see Lowell Dittmer, "The Formal Structure of Central Chinese Political Institutions" in Sidney Greenblatt, Richard W. Wilson and Amy Auerbacher (eds).,
Organizational Behavior in Chinese Society, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981, p. 61.
37. Bennett, supra note 35, p. 7.
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nates) to the Central Committee, 1972 to the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), and 132 to the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection (CCDI). The CAC provides honorific positions to the aging cadres whose active political lives have apparently come to an
end. Their appointments to the CAC may be regarded as a facesaving measure in order to retire them with grace. There is little
evidence that their alleged "advisory" functions amount to significant factors in the governing of China.
The CCDI is expected to be more active than the CAC as the
Party enters a nationwide campaign to tighten discipline and to
crack down on the rapidly growing number of cases of economic
corruption. Chen Yun and General Huang Kecheng, purged in connection with the Peng Dehuai case in 1959, were appointed the First
Secretary and the Second Secretary respectively. But Wang
Heshou-the Permanent Secretary-is expected to run the commission's daily operations. The CCDI's predecessor-Central Control
Commission-was abolished at the Ninth Congress ( 1969) and later
restored at the Eleventh Congress (1977). Its current institutional
arrangement will enable it to exercise functional supervision over a
nation-wide network of provincial Commissions on Inspecting Discipline. How the CCDI implements its important assignments in conjunction with the powerful Central Secretariat, provincial Party
Secretaries, and the public security forces remains somewhat
unclear.
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
The Twelfth Central Committee held its first plenary session on
September 12-13 immediately following the closing of the Congress.
In addition to the approval of the newly elected CAC and CCDI
members, the committee exercised the most important duty of electing its General Secretary, Chairman and Vice-chairman of the Military Commission, and members of the Central Secretariat, the ruling
Politburo and the Politburo Standing Committee. The fact that the
First Plenum was brief suggests the election results had all been predetermined, most likely by such powerful figures as Deng Xiaoping,
Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, and a few others in mutual
consultation.
Only a limited number of the Eleventh CC members were reelected. The figures we have indicate 137 or 39 percent of the 333
original members from the Eleventh Party Congress survived.

Table A
Survival Rate of Politburo and Central Committee Members
Party Congressa

Politburo
(total)
Standing Committee
of Politburo
Alternates
(Death Adjusted)
Central Committee
Regulars
Alternates

Survival Rate {in %}

8th

9th

lOth

llth

12th

26

25

25

23

27

8th on 9th 9th on lOth lOth on llth llth on 12th
35% (9)

64% (16)

60% (l5)b

52% (12)**

(')

0

s:
7
6
195
97
98

5
4
279
170
109

9
4
319
195
124

5
3
333
201
132

6
3
2*
348
210
138

s::
c::
z

39%
28%(54)

73%
72%(202)

71%***
56%C

57%
39%(137)d

• Death: Liu Bocheng, Su Zhenhua
•• Purged or demoted: Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, Xu Shiyou, Chen Yonggui, Geng Biao, Ji Dengkui, Wu De, Chen
Xilian, Peng Chong, Seypidin
• • • Deceased were Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Dong Piwu and Kang Sheng.
Sources: a. Figures on the 8th-10th Party Congresses are from Bennett, supra note 35, pp.23-25.
b. This author's own calculation.
c. James R. Townsend, Politics: China, 2nd edition, Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980, p.
264.
d. Information from Xu Xing, "Ping Zhonggong di shier qu dahui" (On the CCP 12th Party Congress) Zheng
Ming, No. 60 (October 1982), pp. 48-50.
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As Table A shows, this survival rate was lower than those of the
Ninth CC and even the Tenth CC, and only slightly higher than the
Ninth CC which followed the extensive purges during the peak period of the Cultural Revolution. This suggests the rise of the Deng
group to political eminence may have entailed widespread purges,
mostly in the forms of demotion or forced retirement.
THE POLITBURO
Turnover in the Politburo was also substantial. As Table A indicates, only twelve or 52 percent of the original twenty-three members elected in the First Plenum of the Eleventh CC survived.
Taking into account two deceased members-Su Zhenhua and Liu
Bocheng-the survival rate remains only 57 percent. This compares
unfavorably with the survival rate of 64 percent (or 73 percent) between the Ninth and the Tenth Central Committee's First Plenary
sessions, but significantly higher than the 35 percent between the
Eighth and the Ninth due to the impact of the Cultural Revolution.
The fact that the Politburo members' survival rate was higher
than those of the CC poses the possibility that while some senior
leaders remain in the Politburo, their proteges in the second echelon
were demoted or forced out of office altogether. Furthermore, if one
traces the evolution of turnover in the Politburo between the Eleventh CC's Third Plenum and the Twelfth CC's First Plenum, recent
changes in the Politburo composition may not seem nearly as significant. As Table B shows, four members, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao,
Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen were added to the ruling body at the
Third Plenum, while Zhao Ziyang and Peng Zhen subsequently
joinedit at the Fourth Plenum in 1979. Conversely, the "little gang
of four"-Wang Dongxing, Ji Dengkui, Wu De and Chen Xilianwere removed at the Fifth Plenum (1980). Chen Yonggui, the famous Dazhai leader, lost his post at the Sixth Plenum (1981 ).
Change in the Politburo appears to follow the pattern of adding new
members (Third and Fifth Plenums) with the subsequent removals
(Fourth and Sixth Plenums) of the current members whose power
and status had become weaker.
The current Politburo is packed with members of the rehabilitated old guard, all of whom are Deng's confidants. Hua Guofeng
was ousted, and allowed to remain in the Central Committee perhaps only as a face-saving gesture. After all, it was Hua who coengineered the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976. Among the noted
supporters of Hua, only Ye Jianying, General Li Desheng (Shenyang Military Region) and Ni Zhifu (the youthful Director of All-
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China Federation of Trade Unions) survived. However, in March
1983 Ye announced he would not seek re-election to the upcoming
National People's Congress, scheduled to meet in mid-1983. Given
his age (85) and poor physical condition, his days in political life are
numbered. Li and Ni may have already switched sides to support
the Deng-Hu leadership. 38
Among the previous Politburo members, Geng Biao, Peng
Chong and Wang Renzhong were demoted to the CC membership. 39
Observers in Hong Kong speculate that Geng and Peng may have
moved too close to Hua's position in recent years, while Wang's removal was allegedly connected with his mishandling of the Bai Hua
case in his capacity as Director of the CC Propaganda Department.
Members of the current Politburo average seventy-three years
of age. It is a body comprised almost completely of national level
office-holders. Only two--Li Desheng and Qin Jiwei (Commander
of Beijing Military Region)-are from the Military Region. Several
of its members-Ye, Ulanhu, Nie Rongzhen, and Xu Xiangqianhave in fact become politically inactive. Even Li Xiannian was
stripped of his functional duties in the State Council, before being
elected to the newly-restored position of the President of the Republic. The composition of the current Politburo therefore leaves room
for the possibility of more substitution in the next CC Plenary session. The weeding-out process desired by Deng and his associates
may thus continue for a little while longer. In short, the vast majority of the Politburo members appears to be closely allied with Deng,
Hu, and Chen Yun. All of them hold concurrent leadership positions in the Central Secretariat, Military Commission, and the State
Council.
38. See Li Desheng, "Zhixu qingchu zho di xuxiang yingxiang, nuli kaichuang budui
jianshe di xin jumen" (continue to eradicate the influence of leftist thinking, strive for a
new situation in the reconstruction of military forces). Renmin Ribao, Aprill3, 1983, p.
5. In the article, Li called for turning the PLA into a strong "Modern art regularized
revolutionary military force." He also urged the eradication of influence on the PLA of
the leftist errors. The strongest indication of his crossover to support Deng was his praise
of Deng's "remarkable achievements" in purging the leftist and rightist influence after he
assumed the position as chairman of the Military Commission.
39. Hai Feng, "Zhonggong xuanchuan buzhang yi ren mu huo" (Behind the change
of CCP Propaganda Head), Zheng Ming, No. 55 (May 1982), pp. 16-17; and Luo Bing,
"Zhonggong wenwu gaogan di fuchen" (The ups and downs of PRC high officials),
Zheng Ming, No. 62 (December 1982), pp. 7-11. Peng Chong is also charged for his
allegedly "corrupt" life-style - indulging in materialistic luxuries. The arrest of his son
on charges of economic crimes may also have affected him. See Zhongguo Shibao
[China Times (New York)], April 2, 1983, p. 8.
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Standing Committee:
Yao Yilin

Qin Jiwei
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Average age
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Commission
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a. Membership since the 3rd plenum, 1978
b. Membership since the 4th plenum, 1979
c. New members, the 12th Party Congress, 1982. Liao has passed away. At this writing his replacement in the Politburo is not known.
Sources:
Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (Sept. 20, 1982).
Hierarchies of the People's Republic o/ China, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1975).
Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark, Biographic Dictionary o/ Chinese Communism 1921-1965, Vols. I & II (Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press, 1971).
Renmin Ribao, September 13, 1982. Ting Wang, supra note 4, pp. 1-17.
Zheng ming, Hong Kong: supra note Table A.
Xu Xing, No. 60, supra note Table A; Hai Feng, No. 55, supra note 39, pp. 13-29; Luo Bing, No. 62, supra note 39; "Zhonggong san
zhong chuanhuijuanji" (A special edition on the CCP third plenum), No 15 (January 1979), pp. 17-30; Luo Bing, "Fanshipai shi shi
ji" (An account of the Whateverist Faction's loss of power base), No. 16 (February 1979), pp. 5-8; Du Feng, "Wang Dongxing wei shi
mo hui xiatai" (What caused the downfall of Wang Dongxing). No. 30 (April 1980), pp. 34-40; Luo Bing, "Yu Qiuli zhong yu
xiaochuan" (Yu Qiuli's authorities are finally cut down). No. 33 (July 1980), pp. 7-9; Luo Bing, "Hu Yaobang shili pengzhang yu
Deng Hu tixi" (Expansion of Hu Yaobang's power bases and the Deng-Hu system), No. 59 (September 1982), pp. 9-13; and Luo Bing,
"Deng Xiaoping xiangjunzhong zuo wang kaidao" (Deng Xiaoping is purging the military's leftist leaders), no. 61 (November 1982).
pp. 7-12.
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CENTRAL SECRETARIAT

Restoration of the Central Secretariat at the Eleventh CC's
Fifth Plenum is one of the most important institutional developments since the Third Plenum. It was abolished during the Cultural
Revolution at the order of Mao. During 1956-66 when Deng was
General Secretary, the Secretariat grew powerful enough for Mao to
feel threatened by it. Many of its functions were then turned over to
the CC General Office and the Central Cultural Revolution Group
(Zhongyang Wenge Xiaozu) under the control of the Gang of Four.
Restoring the Secretariat was an important step toward re-institutionalizing the Party powers. The new Party Constitution stipulates that "[T)he Secretariat attends to the day-to-day work of the
Central Committee under the direction of the Political Bureau and
its Standing Committee" (Article 21 ). The constitutional delegation
of authorities thus is general and brief, leaving considerable room
for its expansion of activities. Since 1980 the Secretariat has done
just that. These activities will be discussed below.
The Fifth Plenum elected eleven persons to the Secretariat, with
Hu Yaobang as the General Secretary. Others elected were: Wan
Li, Wang Renzhong, Song Renqiong, Fang Yi, Gu Mu, Yu Qiuli,
Yang Dezhi, Hu Qiaomu, Yao Yilin, and Peng Chong. Xi
Zhongxun was added to the roster at the Eleventh CC's Sixth Plenum (1981). The twelfth CC elected, in addition to Hu Yaobang,
nine secretaries-Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun, Deng Liqun, Yang Yong,
Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu, Chen Pixian, Hu Qili, and Yao Yilin, and two
alternates (Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu). As Table C indicates, their
average age was sixty-four, considerably younger and perhaps better
educated (Deng Liqun and Hu Qili are reported to be graduates of
Beijing University) than the Politburo members as a whole. Four of
the previous secretaries-Wan, Song, Hu Qiaomu and Yang
Dezhi-were promoted to the Politburo in 1982, partly as a result of
reassigning their major areas of responsibility while making room
for other upcoming confidants of Hu Yaobang. Wang Renzhong
and Peng Chong were ousted from the secretariat perhaps because of
the same reasons which accounted for their removal from the
Politburo.
The additions of Deng Liqun, the late Yang Yong, Chen Pixian,
Hu Qili, Qiao Shi and Hao Jianxiu to the roster are significant in at
least two respects. They are relatively young (average sixty-one
years of age) and better educated, thus fulfilling the current policy
objective in recruiting younger cadres and leaders. They are known
to be proteges of Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang or Zhao Ziyang.
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Their appointments were highlighted in a biographic sketch in
Renmin Ribao (4/13/82, p. 3) and in Beijing Review (September 20,
1982, pp. 22-24). Hu Qili and Chen Pixian, who is the only provincial Party Secretary to be member of either the Politburo or the Central Secretariat, laid a foundation for their careers in the Communist
Youth League (CYL) ofwhich Hu Yaobang was the First Party Secretary in the 1950s.40 It will be only a matter of time before these
new members of the Secretariat join the Politburo roster.
40. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (September 20, 1982), pp. 23-24.

Table C
CENTRAL SECRETARIAT
(CCP 12th Party Congress)
General Secrerary:
Hu Yaobang

67

Hunan

Politburo Standing Committee

Secreraries:
Wan Li
Xi Zhongxun
Deng Liqun•

66
71
68

Shandong
Shanxi
Hunan

Yang Yong•
Yu Qiuli
Gu Mu
Chen Pixian •

71
68
68
67

Hunan
Jiangxi
Shan dong
Fujian

54
66

Shaanxi
Anhui

Vice-Premier; Politburo
NPC Vice-Chairman; Politburo
Head of CC Propaganda Department Director, Secretariat Research
Office
PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff
Director, PLA General Political Department
State Councillor
Ist Secretary
Hubei Party Committee
Director, General Office, Central Committee
Vice-Premier; State Planning Commission (Minister)

59
48

Zhejiang
Shan dong

Head of International Liaison Department
Minister of Textile Industries

Hu Qi!i•
Yao Yilin
A!lernales:
Qiao Shi•
Hao Jianxiu•
Average age
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• New Members. Yang Yong has passed away. As of this writing his replacement is unknown.
Sources:
Donald W. Klein and Anne B. C!ark,Biographic DiclionaryofChinese Communism, 1921-1965, Vols. I & II. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971.
Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 38 (September 20, 1982), pp. 22-24.
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MILITARY LEADERS IN THE PARTY

Institutionally speaking, the PRC political system maintains
three hierarchies of power structure-the Party, the PLA, and the
government. Leading members of each hierarchy hold positions in
the Politburo and in the Central Committee. Because of the CCP's
experience in the protracted revolutionary wars prior to 1949, military commanders have had a substantial share in the membership of
both the CC and Politburo. As Table D indicates, during 1956-1977,
the percentage of active military professionals in both bodies fluctuated between 28.5 percent in the Tenth CC (1973) and 52.2 percent
in the Eleventh CC Politburo (1977). In spite of the overall rise of
military power during the peak period of the Cultural Revolution,
an increase in their representation in both was only marginal. During these twenty-one years, military representation in the CC was
quite steady, staying within a relatively narrow range of 30 percent
to 44 percent. On the other hand, the percentage of military commanders who occupied the post of Provincial First Secretary shows a
remarkable fluctuation, rising from seven percent in 1965 to 72 percent in 1971. Such a dramatic increase reflected the virtual collapse
of the Party structure in the face of disruption by the Red Guards
and the radicals. By 1977 the percentage illustrated a dramatic
dive-indicating the trend since the 1971 Lin Biao affair-toward
the revival of civilian control over the Party machinery at the
provincal level.

TableD
Military Representation in Party Posts
A.

B.

cc

National:

8th

Politburo:

1956
41.2%
(7 I 17)

lith Elenum
1958
40.0%
(8/20)

Central
31%
Committee
(Regular
members)
(30/97)
Provincial First Secretaries:
Total
Military
%

1965
29
2
7

1971
29
21
72

9th
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lOth

1959
47.6%
(10/21)

1973
28.6%
(6/21)

44%

lith CC 3rd Plenum 4th Elenum 6th Elenum
1979
1981
1977
1978
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52.2%
44.4%
42.9%
(11/28)
(9/24)
(12/23)
( 12/27)

32%

(75/170)
1975
29
14
48
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30%

(63/195) (61/201)

1977
29
6
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1982
25.9%
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Sources:
Figures for the 1956-1981 period are from Shin Chugoku Nenkan (New China Yearbook), Tokyo, Japan, 1982, pp. 103.
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As the following chart indicates, since the Eleventh Party Congress, military representation in all three categories again entered a
period of steady decline. In the first session, active military officers
made up approximately only 19.5 percent (or 41) of the 210 CC full
members, and 25.9 percent (or 7) of the twenty-seven Politburo
members. By 1981 there were only two provincial First Party Secretaries of military orientation left.
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There are several important reasons accounting for the decline of
military influence in Party affairs:
1) Civilian Party-state cadres who were purged during the
Cultural Revolution have been rehabilitated. By the
end of 1980, for instance twenty-five of the twenty-nine
provincial First Secretary posts were taken over by the
rehabilitated cadres. 41
2) The policy pursued by the Deng-Hu leadership has
aimed at undermining the power bases of influential
military commanders in an apparent effort to eliminate
possible sources of challenge to the new Party authorities. Deng Xiaoping has effectively utilized his powers
as Chief of General Staff and Vice-Chairman of the
Military Commission (1977-1980). Later as Chairman
of Military Commission (1981-) he rigorously
41. Zhonggong Nianbao, 1980, supra note 21 p. 12.
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pushed for widespread change of commanders. Since
1979, ten of the eleven PLA Regional Commanders
have been removed (only Li Desheng keeps his Shenyang post), while twenty-two of the twenty-eight Provincial Military District Commanders changed
hands. 42
3) Deng's military modernization programs encounter
fierce opposition from many military leaders. A crackdown against the dissidents is deemed necessary in order to implement these programs. According to one
writer, his programs include: reasserting Party and
government control over the military forces; restricting
the PLA to an essentially military role; professionalizing military ranks and eliminating the overaged, unskilled and unqualified; and modernizing the defense
only as a function of economic modernization as a
whole. 43 In addition, many PLA officers apparently resented cutbacks in the defense budget, the low priority
given to national defense, the one-child campaign, and
the rural policy to reorganize grassroot agricultural
economy. 44 Deng-Hu's determination to downgrade
Mao and Maoism has also met with resistance. 45 Opposition and resistance from the PLA officers necessitated the Party Center's retaliatory actions.
In the final analysis, those PLA officers who subscribe to the Party
leadership and the current national policy measures are the only
ones likely to survive in office. At this juncture it appears highly
unlikely that the military leaders will contemplate a political comeback. Their territorial bases have been severely weakened, and their
voices at the Party's decision-making level substantially curtailed.
42. Cited in V. G. Kulkarni, "Rearguard Action." Far Eastern Economic Review
(hereinafter cited as FEER) (Oct. 8, 1982), p. II.
43. Richard D. Nethercut, "Deng and the Gun: Party-Military Relations in the People's Republic of China," Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 8 (August 1982), p. 692.
44. See Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s, The
China Quarterly, No. 90 (June 1982), p. 242; Jurgen Domes, "New Policies in the Communes: Notes on Rural Societal Structures in China, 1976-1981 ,"Journal ofAsian Studies, vol. XLI, No. 2 (Feb. 1982), pp. 256, 263-264; Pi-chao Chen and Adrienne Kols,
Population and Birth Planning in the People's Republic of China, The Johns Hopkins University's Population Reports, Series J, No. 25, Jan-Feb. 1982, p. 600.
45. Luo Bing, "The Ups and Downs," supra note 39.
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FUNCTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE POWER ELITES

The Twelfth Party Congress was orchestrated by Deng, Hu,
Zhao, and Chen Yun. This was evident from the very beginning
when Deng made the opening speech and Hu delivered a lengthy
political report. Both emphasized basically the same themes, which
had been evolving since the Third Plenum. The day before the Congress opened its sessions, Zhao Ziyang was elected Secretary General of the Congress by the thirty-one member Presidium Standing
Committee; while Deng and Hu's confidants-Hu Qiaomu, Xi
Zhongxun, Yang Shangkun, Deng Liqun, and Hu Qili-were
elected Vice-Secretary Generals. Deng's other protege, Song Renqiong, who heads the CC Organization Department, served as Director of the Congress Membership Committee. In short, the
Congress was a triumphant occasion for the rehabilitated power
elite.
The fact that elderly leaders such as Ye Jianying did not retire
to the CAC can be interpreted as a minor setback for Deng's widely
circulated policy to retire them. On the other hand, the presence of
such senior statesmen as Ye, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Nie
Rongzhan, Xu Xiangqian, and Deng Yingchao (Madame Zhou Enlai) in the Politburo at least adds some validity to the facade of unity
ofleadership. The truth of the matter is that none of them have been
very active in functional responsibility. Their health is deteriorating.
On the surface, Ye, Nie and Xu remain as Vice-Chairman of the
Military Commission while Deng Yingchao and Chen Yun carry
concurrent titles as NPC Vice-Chairman and CCDI First Secretary
respectively. These titles and responsibilities are more honorific
than substantive politically.
The exercise of political powers now rests with the Dengist oligarchy which consists of the following individuals:
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Party Bureaucracy:

Hu Yaobang
Song Renqiong
Wang Zhen
Hu Qiaomu
Hu Qili
Deng Liqun

PLA:

Deng Xiaoping

Yang Shangkun

Yang Dezhi
Qin Jiwei

State Bureaucracy:

Zhao Ziyang
Wan Li
Yao Yilin

Fang Yi

National People's Congress*
Peng Zhen
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Politburo Standing Committee
member and CC General
Secretary
Politburo member and Head of the
CC Organization Department
Poliburo member and President of
the Central Party School
Politburo member, Party Secretary,
and top ideologist
Party Secretary and Director of the
CC General Office Center
Party Secretary and Head of the
CC Propanganda Department
Politburo Standing Committee
member, Chairman of Military
Commission and of the CAC; the
only true generalist leader, and the
only one with the title of chairman
(Zhuxi).
Politburo member, Permanent
Vice-Chairman and Secretary
General of Military Commission
assisting Deng to control the
Commission affairs
Politburo member and Chief of
General Staff
Politburo alternate and
Commander of the strategically
critical Beijing Military Region
Politburo Standing Committee
member and Premier
Politburo member, Party Secretary,
Vice-Premier in charge of
agricultural policy
Politburo alternate, Party
Secretary, Vice-Premier, and
Director of State Planning
Commission
Politburo member, State
Councillor, and Director of State
Scientific and Technological
Commission
Politburo member and NPC
ranking Vice Chairman (probably
next Chairman)
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Xi Zhongxun

Yang Shangkun

Politburo member, Party Secretary
and NPC Vice Chairman, perhaps
a liaison man between NPC and
the Central Secretariat
Politburo member, NPC Vice
Chairman and Secretary General
(in charge of NPC communication
flow and coordinating activities)

* NPC as an institution is becoming important due to the PRC's recent
policy emphasis on national unity and functional differentiation between government and party. See Solinger, supra note 8, pp. 12391269.

Career patterns of these people in recent years lend support to
the view that they have formed a grand coalition, with a varying
degree of interpersonal bonds. As a political group they appear to be
firmly in control of the upper layers of PRC's institutional hierarchies. Outsiders can never fully comprehend the internal workings
of this interlocking power network. Available information about it,
drawn from published statements and career experiences of the network members, provide strong evidence for surmising that they are
strong personalities with a broad policy consensus. Practically all of
these men were purged during the Cultural Revolution. None of
them have been cited as supporters ofthe Gang of Four, Lin Biao, or
Hua; neither have they been known for being sympathetic with the
Maoist radical policies. All of them have major functional jurisdiction while maintaining direct access to the highest decision-making
organs. The only powerful figures who remain functionally active
but not included in this interlocking network are Li Xiannian, Yu
Qiuli and Li Desheng. As a senior statesmen, Li Xiannian remains
influential without actual functional assignments. Yu is widely recognized as the leading figure of the Petroleum Clique. His appointment last fall to replace Wei Guoqing as Director of the PLA's
General Political Department is something of a mystery to many observers, including this author. Li Desheng has continued to survive
since the late 1960s, despite all the political odds against him, and
has remained as the commanding officer of the strategic Shenyang
Military Region. One can only speculate that he has probably struck
a compromise with Deng. Even if this is true, it would be a folly to
include him in the inner circle with Deng, Hu and Zhao.
Within this functional network of the Dengist power elite, those
connected with the Party bureaucracy deserve more attention. As
the Party moves ahead to reassert its authority and to rebuild its bureaucratic network of power, the Central Secretariat may grow fur-
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ther in importance. Hu Yaobang is clearly using the Secretariat to
establish his power base. Because he controls the Party's bureaucratic center, more of his trusted friends and ex-colleagues in the
CYL may be given important future assignments in the provinces
and cities. 46

THE ESSENCE OF GROUP POLITICS
Chinese politics at the levels of both policy-making and implementation have demonstrated a strong propensity toward group conflicts.47 Group tension permeated the political arena particularly
when ideology and policy disputes intensified and institutional functions weakened. The virtual destruction of the Party and the partial
paralysis of state institutions during the Cultural Revolution introduced a political process whereby rules of the game were constrained
very little by the institutional norms and procedures. The question
of group politics being sui generis to the Chinese because of their
social and cultural characteristics remains moot. Scholarly interest
in group analysis of Chinese politics-be it in factions or cliques or
other group phenomena-is strongly influenced by the historical pattern of Chinese political conflicts since 1958. One may also argue
that the nature of PRC group politics has characteristics closely
linked to its developmental stage. When institutional development
becomes stronger and is eventually established, one suspects the
level of informal group conflicts would wither, subside, or at least be
replaced partially by more institutionally based group behaviors.
From 1978 to 1982, the PRC's institutional development continued to suffer from the legacy of the Cultural Revolution. Party rebuilding and the reform of state administration clearly had started at
the national and provincial levels. But the efforts to achieve more
efficient and differentiated institutional governing structures had
been obstructed by Deng's opponents. Institutional development itself in fact became an issue in group conflicts.
46. Those who are being identified as sharing with Hu Yaobang the Chinese Youth
League career backgrounds and are considered personally close to him include: Wu
Xueqian (Foreign Minister), Xiang Nan (Fujian First Party Secretary), Hu Qili (Mayor
of Tienjin), Feng Wenbin (Vice President of Central Party School), Liang Buting
(Qinghai First Party Secretary), Hu Keshi (Associate Dean of National Academy of Sciences), Li Chang (Executive President, Presidium of National Academy of Sciences), and
Yu Weijing (publisher of Beijing Daily). See Luo Bing "Hu Yaobang shili" supra note
Table B.
47. In general, groups are not institutionalized organizations; neither do they have
clear boundaries or internal rules which can be observed. Their importance varies in
time, and fluctuates according to conflict arena.
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In the period under study, one can identify at least three levels
in the intensity of group conflict which corresponded to different areas of debate. The highest level involved ideological disputes over
Mao and Maoism, which were intertwined with personal striving for
power and influence. The second level was characterized by conflict
over military modernization and the PLA's role in politics; the third
by policy differences regarding economic modernization-its overall
thrust, developmental strategy, and sectoral rankings in priority.
The intensity of conflict at each level varied, but it corresponded
with the descending order of the three levels above. Every major
participant in the national politics of that time conceivably possessed
views on each of the issues of these three areas of conflict. Many of
these men probably perceived the ultimate resolution of the conflict
as being intimately linked to the progress of their own careers. As
Michel Oksenberg would argue, the issues and choices these conflicts
of view and interest pose "determine the parameters and the opportunities for the exercise of power." 48 Available evidence indicates
the existence of two principal adversary groups in each conflict
arena. Participants only marginally involved in each arena would
play supportive roles or simply chose to be cast as bystanders. The
overriding factors which shaped the formation of political groups
were most likely to include: ideological perspective, policy preference, position and power, common college ties in the past or present,
a shared institutional base, and shared personal stakes during the
Cultural Revolution. Combinations of any of these factors resulted
in mutual reinforcement, providing a basis for grouping.
A.

Conflicts over Mao, Maoism and Political Powers

Once the Gang of Four and their principal allies were arrested,
PRC politics immediately turned to the fundamental issues of Mao
and Maoism. Many leaders who owed their political fortunes to
Mao during the Cultural Revolution had remained loyal to him and
insisted that Mao's deeds and thought be inequivocally followed.
They included such prominent figures as Hua Guofeng, Wang
Dongxing (Mao's ex-bodyguard), Chen Xilian (Commander of Beijing Military Region), Wu De (Mayor of Beijing), Ji Dengkui and
Chen Yonggui (both identified as leaders in agricultural field). The
regime's continuing adherence to Mao and Maoism would have le48. Oksenberg, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," supra note 2, p. 3. Oksenberg did
not discuss these three levels of conflict. Rather, he was attempting to link Chinese politics with such major issues as China's distinct path of development.
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gitimized the powerful positions they then occupied. On the other
hand, Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Chen Yun, Yang Shangkun, Xi
Zhongxun, and Yang Dezhi, for instance, followed the precept that
Mao did make serious mistakes in his later life, and that canonizing
his thought was unacceptable. Instead, they invented the slogan that
"practice is the sole criterion to test truth." Applying this yardstick,
theory must be rested against reality; as reality changes, theory must
be modified. The validity of Maoist theories must be continually
scrutinized-not worshiped. In fact, all of these men had suffered
immensely, largely because of the alleged mistakes made in the
name of Mao and Maoism, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. Their return to active political life required some diminution of
the authority of Mao Zedong.
The battle line was thus drawn between these two groups. In a
broader sense, all political beneficiaries of the Cultural Revolution
had good reason to side with Hua's group. By the same token, all
victims of the Cultural Revolution would have the natural inclination to back the Dengist position. But only a selective number of the
elite strata were in the forefront of this tension-ridden confrontation.
From the standpoint of Deng and his comrades-in-arms, the neoMaoists who had played a part in their political misfortunes must be
identified as the principal targets for political struggle. From the
Third Plenum to the Fifth Plenum, the Dengist group thus focused
its efforts on attacking the power bases of these neo-Maoists. DengHu's control over the central Party bureaucracy, the disbanding of
Wang Dongxing's "8341" Garrison Troop, the dismissals of Chen
Xilian and Wu De from their Beijing posts, and the subsequent ousting of Wang, Chen, Wu, Ji, and Chen Yonggui from the Politburo
effectively crippled the power bases of this group. The CC's official
reversal of past verdicts on the Tiananmen Incidents, the Peng
Dehuai case, and later on the Liu Shaoqi case completely cleared the
way for the Dengist group's return to legitimacy and the tens of
thousands of cadres implicated in these cases return to active political life and career responsibility.
B.

Conflicts Over Military Modernization and the PLA's Political
Role

Broadly speaking, the conflicts over military modernization and
the PLA's political role affected a wide spectrum of the political and
military elite. But the heart of these controversies had mainly involved conflict between some active military officers and the DengHu leadership. It would be misleading to portray the military of-
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ficers as a homogeneous group. They are not. In fact, some of the
military officers, e.g., the late Yang Yong, Yang Dezhi, Yang
Shangkun, Zhang Aiping (Defense Minister), and Qin Jiwei, belonged to the Deng-Hu camp. Many of Deng's military opponents
had supported his rehabilitation, opposed the radical excesses of the
Gang of Four, and did not participate directly in the struggle between Deng and the "Whateverists." Still, they remained loyal to
Mao and Maoism. The Dengist military modernization plan was
viewed as the antithesis of the Maoist military doctrine.
The Party's decision to pursue modernization since the Third
Plenum has thus brought about opposition even from those who had
previously supported Deng. The PLA as a whole has not fared well
in the priority list of the Four Modernizations. In fact from 1979 to
1981, the percentage of the military budget in relation to the total
budget shrunk from 17.48 percent to 16.74 percent. 49 As early as
1975, the Party had instructed the PLA to withdraw from the political arena, and to concentrate its efforts on defense and military
training. 50 The PLA's share in the Party's decision-making declined
steadily since the Eleventh Party Congress. At the Twelfth Party
Congress, the percentage of PLA members elected to the CC shrunk
to 19.5 percent; and among the CC alternates, its share was a meager
15 percent. Members of the old guard with a weak orientation toward modem military warfare have been sent "upstairs" to occupy
honorific positions in the Central Advisory Commission. Of the
Commission's 172 members, about one-third are from the military
ranks. 5 1 All five components of the PRC military modernization as
enumerated by Thomas Robinson adversely affected the career interests of such old guard members. The programs included: 52
1. Component modernization: training, education, organization, command, control, communication;
2. Manpower modernization: size and composition of
armed forces, age, structure of leadership, etc.;
3. Material component: physical supports to the armed
forces, including steady flow of well-trained recruits,
logistic base, and abilities to feed, house, and clothe the
military;
49. Dittmer, "China in 1981: Reform, Readjustment, Rectification," Asian Survey,
Vol. XXII, No. I (January 1982), p. 41.
50. Thomas W. Robinson, "Chinese Military Modernization in the 1980s," supra
note 44, p. 239.
51. V. G. Kulkarni, "A Retreat from Power," FEER, April 7, 1983, p. 20.
52. Robinson, supra note 44, pp. 231-232.
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4.
5.

Doctrinal modernization: in both strategy and tactics;
Societal components: army-Party relationship, issue of
professionalism, privileges and status of the military
men.
Deng's modernization plans have a practical effect on all of
these five components. Thus conflicts over each component between
Deng's reformist policies and the military diehards favoring a status
quo became inevitable. For instance, the Dengists advocate better
military education and modern warfare training for the officer corps.
They want to trim the size of the four million-plus PLA, perhaps by
as much as a 10 percent reduction in the next five years. 53 A system
of age limits for each rank-level of the military hierarchy has been
gradually adopted in much the same way as those of the Party and
state cadres. 54 Forced retirements of the old guard may have
reached 10-15 percent of the entire officer corps last year alone.
While senior officers are being pensioned off fast, new recruits have
been hampered by the rural economic policy and the one-child campaign. Soldiers' prestige, status, and privileges are suffering. The
Party center is now exerting more control over the PLA personnel
and propaganda policies. It is only logical that many officers are
irritated; many perceived their vital interests being threatened
seriously.
But the PLA objections to changing military doctrine and overall ideological thrust are also profound. Following the removal of
the commanders implicated in the Lin Biao affair and the Gang of
Four affair, supporters of Hua's leadership became the principal
targets of purge. This process ended about the time of the Sixth Plenum. The Deng-Hu leadership then turned against many of its previous supporters, such as Wei Guoqing, Xu Shiyou, and their
proteges. The PLA political department's "Mishandling" of the Bai
Hua case triggered another round of purges culminating in the 1982
dismissal of its Director, Wei Guoqing, his staff and five Regional
Commanders. 55 According to Leo Lee, initial reluctance of the
Party to reprint the PLA article (in the People's Daily, for instance)
criticizing Bai Hua's film-script, "Unrequited Love", signaled a rift
53. Kulkarni, supra note 50, pp. 22.
54. Ibid. According to Kulkarni, the age limit for divisional-level officers is 50, and
for the regimental level, 45.
55. Details about the Bai Hua incident, see Leo Qu-fan Lee "Literary Policy in the
People's Republic of China: A Position Paper" in Hung-mao Tien (ed.), Mainland China,
Taiwan and US Policy, Cambridge, Mass: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain, Publishers,
Inc. 1983, pp. 108-112; also see Luo Bing, supra note Table B.
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between the Party and the military; this in tum "angered some highechelon generals who brought more pressure to bear on Hu
Yaobang." 56 Wei and his subordinates in the headquarters of the
PLA Political Department were reportedly harboring a neo-Maoist
line; so were the ex-Minister of Defense Geng Biao and Politburo
member Xu Shiyou. Wei and Xu are said to have provided Deng
with last-ditch protection in Guangdong when Deng was ousted in
1976-77.
C.

Economic Modernization and the Conflict with the Petroleum
Clique

The third arena of group conflict has taken place in the field of
economic modernization. The policy rift appears to be polarized between the reformist group of Chen Yun, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and
Yao Yilin, and the Petroleum Clique, centered on Yu Qiuli, Gu Mu,
Kang Shien and Song Zhenming. Sometimes Deng and Hu's positions are not clear-cut, but lean toward the reformists in general policy thrust.
In addition to Yu, Gu, Kang and Song, the Petroleum Clique
reportedly also included Tang Ke, Yang Yibang, and Lin Hujia. 57
All of them were associates of Yu Qiuli in the Petroleum Ministry
when he was Minister in the 1950s and early 1960s. Through the
years, they formed a close-knit college friendship. During the Cultural Revolution they carried out Maoist economic policies which
stressed mass mobilization techniques in the production process.
Their political fortunes were at least partly related to the success of
the Daqing oil field. Overall they tended to favor centralization,
with emphasis on heavy industries and agricultural mechanization.
Jurgen Domes suggests that the Petroleum Clique greatly influenced
Hua's modernization concept. 5 8 The Draft Outline of the Ten Year
Plan for the National Economy, which Hua presented to the first
session of the Fifth NPC (February 26-March 5, 1978), incorporated
many of the Petroleum Clique's ideas. As a group they were powerful in the State Council during Hua's premiership, particularly from
1977 to 1980. In fact, from 1978 to 1980 all three major Commissions of the State Council-State Planning, State Economics, and
56. Lee, Ibid., p. 102.
57. Tang Ke was Minister of Metallurgical Industry when he signed the agreement to
build the Bao Shan steel complex with the Japanese. Yang Yibang was Vice Minister of
Petroleum Ministry. Lin Hujia was Minister of Agriculture and Mayor of Tianjin and
Beijing.
58. Domes, "1976-82", supra note 22, pp. 1-10.
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State Capital Construction-were headed by Yu Qiuli, Kang Shien
and Gu Mu respectively.
The return to power of Chen Yun and the rise of Zhao Ziyang
immediately posed a challenge to the Petroleum Cli~ue's hold of the
State Council's economic and energy bureaucracies. 9 By 1980, the
Draft Outline's Capital Construction Program had run into serious
trouble. The oil rig incident in Bohai Gulf on November 25, 1979,
became a convenient issue for the attacking of the Petroleum Clique.
In September 1980 at the third session of the Fifth NPC, Petroleum
Minister Song Zhenming was fired, Vice Premier Yu Qiuli lost his
position as Commissioner of the State Planning Commission, and
Vice Premier Kang Shien was recorded as having received minor
Party discipline. Minister Tang Ke's alleged mishandling of the
Baoshan steel complex project encountered serious criticism within
the high circle. Mayor Li Hujia of Beijing was also under heavy fire
for bringing in pollution-causing heavy industrial plants to the city.
He was later removed in early 1981.
Fundamentally, the debate over the priorities of China's economic modernization pitted the group of Zhao, Chen, Yao and Wan
Li against the Petroleum Clique. The latter is said to have obtained
Li Xiannian's backing. Li and the Petroleum Clique favored heavy
industry, capital industry, structural centralization in economic administration, and mass mobilization. Chen and Zhao on the other
hand were committed to market principles, light industry, consumerism, and drastic reform of the rural agricultural policy. But their
differences went beyond economic policy and structure. There was
apparent rivalry between these groups in controlling the State Council's economic planning machinery. Because Zhao, Chen, Yao and
Wan Li had been strong political allies of Deng and Hu, they enjoyed considerable advantage in the rivalry. By 1980-81, the distribution of political power at the Party center had become such that
the Zhao-Chen group replaced the Petroleum Clique in capturing
the government economic planning and implementation
bureaucracies.
But the policy dispute over economic development has not generated the same degree of political antagonism as in the two other
areas of conflict. Yu Qiuli's appointment as Director of the PLA
Political Department and continuing publicity accrued to Li Xian59. Chen Yun's return to power in December 1978 may have contributed considerably to the major shift of economic policy away from emphasis on high accumulation and
heavy industry, and toward adoption of market mechanisms. See Oksenberg and Bush,
supra note 13, p. 9.
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nian's activities in the official media are clear evidence that the Petroleum Clique remains influential in the national politics.
In short, the group conflicts in PRC's elite politics manifested
different levels of intensity, as the preceding analyses have indicated.
There was obvious overlapping of group members; but in each conflict arena, at least two principal antagonistic groups can be identified. Whether these groups existed as factions, cliques, or in some
other form can be the subject of endless debate. Whether these
groups have been formed on the basis of one set or another of social,
cultural, economic, and institutional characteristics is not particularly important in the context of this discussion. Given the fact that
many group members have reached retirement age, the future of
Chinese group politics is likely to change. When the principal adversaries are eliminated, what previously appeared to be internal differences may suddenly be seen as new factors in the escalation of
group conflicts. Indeed, as Oksenberg and Bush have indicated,
"Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and their particular supporters may
have important differences among themselves." 60 In light of this, it
would be extremely hazardous at this point to predict the likelihood
of emerging power relationships-for instance, among Hu Yaobang,
Zhao Ziyang, Yu Qiuli, Li Desheng, Yao Yilin, Yang Shangkun, Xi
Zhongxun, Yang Dezhi, and Qin Jiwei--once Deng and Chen Yun
pass away.
PARTY REBUILDING

The CCP's party rebuilding began in the early 1970s; it gathered
momentum soon after the 3rd plenum was over. The guiding principle was to differentiate the Party from the government in their pursuit of structural and functional developments. Hu Yaobang's
political report at the 12th Party Congress stressed the Party's principal role in exercising "political and ideological leadership in matters
of principle and policy and in the selection, allocation, assessment
and supervision of cadres." 61 Five categories of people are excluded
from leading posts in the Party and government administrative
structures. They include those rising to prominence by "rebellion;"
those seriously factionalist in their ideas; those indulging in beating,
smashing, and looting; those opposing the CC's 3rd plenum line; and
those seriously violating the law and discipline. 62 The implications
60. Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 10.
61. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 37 (September 13, 1982), p. 35.
62. Ibid., p. 36.
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are obvious. Cadres who acquired positions during the "rebellious
and faction-ridden" period of the Cultural Revolution will be removed. Radicals opposing Deng-Hu's new Party line will be weeded
out. Those who are suspected of engaging in disruptive and corrupt
activities will be ousted to ensure party discipline. On the other
hand, the Party cadre policy emphasizes the recruitment and promotion of those who are revolutionalized (meaning those who have accepted the Deng-Hu policy lines), who are younger, and who possess
specialized skills and higher educational level. In short, the policy is
to rebuild a party with a group of cadres who are professionally
competent, and devoted to the policy of modernization as interpreted by the Deng-Hu leadership. These newly-instituted criteria
should be regarded as only necessary but not sufficient criteria for
recruitment and promotion as applied in the Chinese political context. These criteria could at times become the convenient yardsticks
for eliminating Deng-Hu's political opponents. Older cadres with
little education or specialized skills and who are suspect because of
their earlier support of the Gang of Four and the Whateverists will
be purged under this formula.
Wholesale change and the reorientation of cadres has invited
widespread resistance. Many feel threatened by the Party policy, although others are likely to benefit from it. A People's Daily editorial
noted that only 58.7 percent of the 20 million cadres (including nonparty members) possess a high school level education. 63 About 11
million of them (55 percent) fall under the range of 36-55 years old,
the principal age category set by the Party for recruiting or retaining
cadres for the factory, college, county, municipality, and provincial
levels. 64 Insufficient education of the cadres poses a serious problem
for the PRC's modernization drive. Of the 450,000 leading cadres
above the level of vice magistrates, 310,000 or 69 percent are under
55 years old. 65 In other words, about 31 percent of the leading cadres at this level or above are potential targets for weeding out. In
general, as much as 45 percent of the second-echelon cadres may be
targeted for substitution. The overall thrust of current cadre policy
is the commitment to building more rigorous administrative teams.
Speaking at the cadres conference on January 16, 1980, Deng Xiaoping emphasized that local, as well as county, leaders in the production and service units, including Party secretaries, must be recruited
63. Renmin Ribao, Editorial, October 29, 1982, p. I.
64. Song Renqiong, Hongqi, No. 407 (October I, 1983), p. 12.
65. Renmin Ribao, February 23, 1983, p. I. Figures were given by Song Renqiong at
the Party Schools Work Conference which was convened on February 22.
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from the age category between 36 and 44, and possess specialized
knowledge. 66 Those who had graduated from colleges during 196166 fit into this category and were particularly singled out for recruitment because of their ages and education backgrounds.
The problems associated with the cadres' inadequate background in education, skill, and age are all too real. The CCP faces
yet another serious issue related to the Party members' ineptness and
ideological flux. Of the current 39 million members, 40.6 percent
reportedly had joined the Party during the Cultural Revolution, 45.4
percent before 1966, and 14 percent since 1976; and only 15.8 percent of all of them possess at least high school education. 67 One
Western reporter detected a pervasive leftist tendency among Party
members and cadres, manifested in the form of "obstructive nihilism
which seeks to avoid responsibility and put up passive resistence to
the Deng leadership's reformist policies." 68 Poor attitude and passive work style are now targeted for eradication in the Party's current
rectification campaign, which has intensified since 1980. A more
worrisome phenomenon is the widespread existence of the "Crisis of
Three Faiths," meaning the loss of confidence in the Party, Socialism, and the Four Modernizations. Many Chinese youth, even the
students of elite universities who have better career prospects, profess to have such an attitudinal tendency. A survey of Beijing University students in 1981 found that "crisis of faith" rated the most
serious of three problems identified by the students. 69 Another poll
conducted at Fudan University, Shanghai, revealed that only thirty
percent of the respondents retain strong faith in communism or socialism, while 25 percent believe in "nothing at all," a sign of nihilism and alienation, one scholar concludes. 70
Clearly there is no easy answer to these deep-seated problems.
The Deng-Hu leadership apparently envisions that the success of
modernization programs as well as of Party-rebuilding and the restoration of the Party powers are primary steps toward their ultimate
solutions. During the period of 1978-83, this leadership appears to
66. "Deng Xiaoping Kuanyu muqian xingshi he renwu di baogao," (Report by Deng
Xiaoping concerning the current situations and tasks) Zheng Ming, No. 29 (March 1980),
pp. 11-12.
.
67. Renmin Ribao, Editorial, supra note 62.
68. David Bonavia, "Down but not yet out," FEER (February 14, 1983), p. 22.
69. Dittmer, "China in 1981: Reform Readjustment, Rectification," Asian Survey
vol. 22, No. I (January, 1982), p. 39.
70. Alan P. L. Liu, "Political Decay on Mainland China: On Crisis of Faith, Confidence and Trust," Chang King-yuh (ed), The Emerging Teng System, Vol. II, supra note
23 pp. 3-4.
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have mapped a strategy of Party-rebuilding that started at the very
top, and which must gradually filter down to the grassroots.
The initial effort brought about confrontation between the
Deng-Hu leadership and the Whateverists in late 1978 over the control of the Party's bureaucratic center. As discussed earlier in this
article, this involved the struggle to gain control of the CC General
Office, the Organization Department, the Propaganda Department,
the Central Party School, and the Politburo. By the time the CC's
5th plenum was held in 1980, this initial phase had practically been
completed. The Central Secretariat headed by Hu Yaobang was restored, and Hua's principal allies in the Politburo-Wang Dongxing,
Wu De, Chen Xilian and Ji Dengkui-were ousted. Wholesale
changes of the CC members, First Party Secretaries and Party Committees of the provinces and municipalities, which began at the 3rd
plenum, picked up momentum following the 5th plenum. By April
1983, the work was virtually finished. Progress of personal changes
appeared to have kept pace with the stages of Deng-Hu's success in
capturing the Party center. At the 3rd plenum, nine rehabilitated
cadres were added to the CC roster and twelve more at the 4th plenum. Of the 333 original CC members from the 11th Party Congress, only 137 or 33 percent survived in the 12th CC. Changes of
provincial level First Party Secretaries began in 1979. By the end of
1980, 25 of the 29 First Secretaries were rehabilitated cadres. From
November 1982 to April 1983, all provincial secretaries and/or Party
committees were reorganized. 71 Their members were reduced as
part of a national campaign to trim the office holders. Intelligentsia--college professors, engineers, etc.-joined the roster in growing
numbers. Average ages in the Party committees were approximately
four to five years younger than before.
The Party reform is now also pursued through a more broadly
based rectification campaign. Its concrete programs include establishing classes for regular job training (pei xun ), rotating study (lun
xun) on ideology, Party lines, and membership requirements, and
part-time studies at night through correspondence and radio broadcast courses. 72 Practices varied according to provinces and cities.
Major purposes are to upgrade job skills and overall knowledge, and
to foster ideological indoctrination of cadres and Party members. In
October, 1982, a decision was made that henceforth the staff in the
71. The newly "elected" secretaries and committee members appear to be solidly
behind the Deng-Hu leadership and their overall policies. See the Pro-PRC Shidai Bao
(San Francisco), Editorial, May 7, 1983, p. I.
72. Beijing Review, Vol. 25, No. 43 (October 25, 1982), pp. 5-6.
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central Party government bureaucracies would be required to undergo 6 months of full-time re-education once every 3 years. All
cadres in the central staff must achieve a level of educational and
professional proficiency equivalent to high school graduates. Provincial Party schools have been restored; provincial Party organizations also offer a variety of educational and reorientation programs
to improve the cadres' skills and professional knowledge. 73 The CC
Organization Department also dispatches teams to investigate Party
work in the factory, in provincial and municipal units. 74 Ad hoc
programs in selective locations are set up to offer rotating studies. In
1980 alone, 32 million Party members reportedly attended the rotating studies to become familiar with the 3rd plenum lines and the
draft of proposed Party Constitution. 75 Similar programs were repeated in 1981. In July-August, 1982, 449,000 Party members or
68.8 percent of the total within the jurisdiction of Beijing Party organization participated in such programs. 76 The remaining members
were expected to follow suit in September. The CCP central authorities are apparently ready to stage a nationwide membership rectification campaign. In the process, a substantial number of Party
members recruited during the Cultural Revolution are expected to
be expelled.
Among all of these training or reorientation programs, those
run by the Party schools are considered to be most important insofar
as upgrading the qualifications of cadres are concerned. Such programs in the Party schools serve a form of what Harry Harding describes as "re~ularized internal remedialism," aimed at cadre
indoctrination. 7 The Central Party School, shut down in 1966, was
re-opened in 1977. Within two years, most provincial Party schools
were restored.
The Central Party School is run by Wang Zhen (President),
Jiang Nanxiang (First Vice-President) and Feng Wenpin (VicePresident). All three have close ties with the Deng-Hu leadership.
From 1977 to 1982, 17,883 cadres attended the Party school pro73. In Shanxi, for instance, such schools graduated 4,259 cadres last year and are
currently enrolling 3,130. See Renmin Ribao, April 4, 1983, p. I. David Bonavia reported that in early 1983 there were more than 2000 such schools in the nation. See
"Down but not yet out," supra note 68, p. 24.
74. Recently the department dispatched two teams to 14 provinces and cities, studied
72 enterprise units, and engaged in broad discussions with over 100 cadres who have
specialized skills. See Renmin Ribao, March 30, 1983, p. I.
75. Renmin Ribao, November 29, 1982, p. I.
76. Renmin Ribao, September 2, 1982, p. 5.
77. Harding, Organizing China, supra note 5, p. 331.
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grams. 78 In Fall 1982, 1,300 cadres enrolled in the main campus of
the school while an additional 3,600 central cadres studied in two
branch campuses. 79 The school offers rotating studies and classes for
studying communist theories. 80
The rotating studies class offers a two year curriculum for leading cadres in provincial and prefecture governments. Entrance examinations are required, but applicants must possess college degrees
and high school diplomas respectively. Both must have five years'
work experience. Age limits are 45 for the provincial cadres and 40
for those from the prefecture. They study Marxism-Leninism-Mao
Zedong Thought (55 percent of study time), science, and specialized
subjects.
The theory class is designed to turn out teachers for provincial
Party schools and to train career Party ideologists in managing the
propaganda organs above the county level. This is also a two-year
curriculum. Possession of a college degree or an equivalent educational level plus three years of work experience is required for eligibility for the entrance examinations. The age limit is 35. In addition
to the Central Party School, there are over 8,100 Party and other
schools. 81 During 1979-81, over 200,000 leading cadres at county
level and above had received a variety of training through rotating
studies. 82 Hu Yaobang had said that a pervasive rectification aimed
at the Party rank-and-file members will commence in the second half
of 1983. In six years after the Party's rebuilding efforts began, the
CCP has evidently recovered from its pre-1958 form. Without a
doubt, the Party once again asserts itself as the true locus of political
powers in the PRC regime.

THE SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
From the preceeding analyses, the power transfer in the postMao era has evidently moved from the hands of Hua Guofeng, Y e
Jianying, Wang Dongxing, and Li Xiannian to those ofDeng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang and Chen Yun, and was virtually
complete by the 12th Party Congress. This process took about four
years, from approximately mid-1978 to September 1982. Members
of the power elite closely identified with the later years of Mao and
78. Renmin Ribao, August 25, 1982, p. I.
79. Renmin Ribao, September 5, 1982, p. I. The figures were given by Wang Zhen in
his speech delivered in the Central Party School.
80. Renmin Ribao, February 19, 1982, p. I.
81. Song Renqiong, Hongqi, supra note 63, p. 14.
82. Ibid.
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Maoism were discredited, and many were eliminated from active
political life. Maoist ideological line, policies and institutions have
been mostly modified or discarded. The value of Mao Zedong as a
revolutionary charismatic leader in legitimizing the regime's authorities has lost his validity. The transformation of China has clearly
entered the post-mobilization phase. As one examines the new directions of policy and institutional developments, one is struck by
the extent to which the PRC's political system has been undergoing
rapid change.
The following statements are conclusions based on the information utilized in this study.
1. Re-establishing institutionalized one-party rule: The CCP
Party organization has been rebuilt. The process of reestablishing
institutional hierarchies, norms and procedures had mostly been
achieved by 1982. The Party center is now controlled by the rehabilitated senior cadres associated with the Deng-Hu group. Radical
Hua and his close associates also have been edged out. Younger and
better educated cadres with functional skills are also on the rise, particularly at the levels of provincial, municipal and county Party organs. Party powers become once again the dominant factor in the
PRC's political process. 83 Power elites at the top form a functional
system whereby each key leader in the Politburo and the Central
Secretariat is given a functional area of responsibility. In spite of
Deng's overall dominant position, collective leadership has been
adopted as operational rule. Conscious efforts are made to separate
the Party from government-in structure, function and personnel.
Available evidence, however, points to continuing fusion of membership and authorities between the two institutional spheres with
the Party in commanding position. The assertion of powers by the
CCP over other institutional domains is in fact growing.
2. In the wake of growing Party power and the stress on building a modern, professionalized military, the PLA's political power
has been severely curtailed. PLA top brass who refuse to accept the
new political order are removed. Members of the old guard lacking
knowledge, skill, and interest in modernizing the armed forces are
being pensioned off. Military representation in the Party-the
Politburo, the Central Committee, and provincial Party organs-has
been scaled down considerably. Using the five Field Army systems
83. Oksenberg and Bush's study also conclude that the Party "would retain its monopoly of power and be revitalized in order to perform well its distinctive role". See
Oksenberg and Bush, supra note 13, p. 10.
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or Military Regions for the purpose of establishing the PLA leader's
power bases may be a thing of the past. If the current trend persists,
military intervention in the PRC politics may be gradually coming to
an end.
3. The current party policy in stressing education, skill and
over-all professional competence as criteria for promotion and recruitment could give rise to a "dual executive" system in administration and management. 84 This would direct China's leadership style
toward the Soviet model. Increasingly, cadres must be both "red"
and "expert".
4. Formation of political groups, as evident since the mid1970s, involve a multiplicity of factors. Group conflicts cut across
power, ideological, and policy considerations. As far as the post-3rd
plenum period is concerned, the most salient characteristics in group
politics have been the struggles between the victims and beneficiaries
of the Cultural Revolution. This suggests the conflict process entails
a strong character of revenge politics. To be sure, within the Dengist
grand coalition, there exists a variety of policy oriented groups. For
the moment the stakes for their continuing unity remain high. Thus
internal dissension may assert itself only if Deng passes away in the
near future.
5. In the PRC political system, ideology-Maoist ideology in
particular-as the basis for the regime's legitimacy has severely
eroded. 85 The dictum of "Seek Truths and Facts" contributes immensely toward the process of ideological erosion. Such erosion interacts broadly with the evidently popular outcry over the "Crisis of
Three Faiths." Even students of the elite universities, such as Beida
and Fudan, whose career prospects actually seem more promising
than most others under the current recruitment policy have expressed the same sentiments. The PRC's legitimacy, if indeed that
needs to be justified, would probably depend more on the progress of
the Four Modernizations. Democratic elections and permission for
more spontaneous group activity would help; but at this stage of
China's political development, such expectations are premature. In
view of the evolving overall political characteristics, the PRC system
84. George Fischer, The Soviet System and Modern Society, New York: Atherton
Press, 1968, pp. 47-91.
85. Richard Lowenthal argues that "most regimes created by revolutional violence
acquire effective legitimacy, ... simply through passage of time; people grow up with
them and come to regard them as normal." See his "The Ruling Party in a Mature
Society," in Mark G. Field, ed., Social Consequences of Modernization in Communist Societies, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 101.
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would probably fit well in H. Gordon Skilling's description of a
Consultative Authoritarianism, whereby the Party leadership monopolizes decisions and refuses to tolerate any spontaneous group
activity. 86
6. This study does not focus its analyses on the state institutional development. It should be pointed out, however, that institutional developments during the 1978-82 period also extended to the
reform of state structures and personnel policy. Research results
elsewhere and in the PRC's official reports indicate a continuing process of retrenchment in the government bureaucracy. By 1982 such a
process appeared to be completed at the central government level.
One writer recently suggested that the reformist objectives are to
achieve structural differentiation and institutionalization in order to
make governance more effective_B? Such institutional reforms have
been initiated at the provincial and local government levels, but the
overall process may be more time-consuming. By the end of 1982,
for instance, only 69 of the nation's 2,000 counties and cities have
established separate township governments in replacing the existing
commune collective structures. 88 The decision to reform the rural
communes had been adopted four years earlier. Resistance to such
institutional changes are evidently strong and widespread. Nonetheless, under the current leadership and policy direction, significant
changes in institution will most likely continue.
86. H. Gordon Skilling classifies single-party authoritarian systems into five types:
quasi-totalitarianism, consultative authoritarianism, quasi-pluralistic authoritarianism,
democratizing and pluralistic authoritarianism, and anarchic authoritarianism (China
during the Cultural Revolution). See his "Group Conflict and Political Change" in
Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Natitons, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1981, pp. 222-229.
87. Michael Ng-Quinn, "Deng Xiaoping's Political Reform and Political Order,"
Asian Survey, Vol. XXII, No. 12 (December 1982), pp. 1190-1191.
88. Beijing Review, Vol. 26, No. 7 (February 14, 1983), p. 5.
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Legal Aspects of U.S.-Republic of China Trade and Investment- Proceedings of a Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law (Edited by Hungdah Chiu and David Simon) 217 pp.
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Asian American Assembly Position Paper: I. A Review of U.S. China
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ISBN 0-942182-11-1
Asian American Assembly Position Paper: II. A Review of U.S. Employment Policy 24 pp.
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ISBN 0-942182-12-X
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ISBN 0-942182-13-8
Normalizing Relations with the People's Republic of China: Problems,
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$3.00
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Growth, Distribution, and Social Change: Essays on the Economy of the
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ISBN 0-942182-15-4
The Societal Objectives of Wealth, Growth, Stability, and Equity in Tai$1.00
wan (Jan S. Prybyla) 31 pp.
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ISBN 0-942182-19-7
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$2.00
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ISSN 0730.0107

ISBN 0-942182-20.0

Two Korea's Unification Policy and Strategy (Yong Soon Yim) 82 pp.
Index
$2.00
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ISBN 0-942182-21-9

Asian Immigrants and Their Status in the U.S. (Edited by Hungdah
Chiu) 54 pp.
$2.00
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ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-22-7

Social Disorder in Peking After the 1976 Earthquake Revealed by a Chi$2.00
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ISBN 0-942182-23-5
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$3.00
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$2.00
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$3.50
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$1.50
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ISBN 0-942182-35-9
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Annual Review of Selected Books on Contemporary Asian Studies
(1979-1980) (Edited by John F. Copper) 45 pp.
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No. 1 - 1981 (38)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-37-5

Structural Changes in the Organization and Operation of China's Crimi$1.50
nal Justice System (Hungdah Chiu) 31 pp.
No. 2 - 1981 (39)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-38-3

Readjustment and Reform in the Chinese Economy (Jan S. Prybyla) 58
pp.
$1.00
No. 3 - 1981 (40)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-39-1

Symposium on the Trial of Gang of Four and Its Implication in China
(Edited by James C. Hsiung) 118 pp.
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ISSN 0730-0107
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China and the Law of the Sea Conference (Hungdah Chiu) 30 pp.
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ISBN 0-942182-42-1

Chinese Regionalism: Yesterday and Today (Franz Michael) 35 pp.
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$2.00
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ISSN 0730-0107
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Proceedings of Conference on Multi-system Nations and International
Law: International Status of Germany, Korea, and China (Edited
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by Hungdah Chiu and Robert Downen) 203 pp. Index
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ISSN 0730-0107
No. 1 - 1982 (46)
Socialist Legalism: Reform and Continuity in Post-Mao People's Republic of China (Hungdah Chiu) 35 pp.
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No. 2 - 1982 (47)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-46-4

Kampuchea, The Endless Tug of War (Justus M. Vander Kroef) 51 pp.
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No. 3 - 1982 (48)

ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-47-2

Social Change on Mainland China and Taiwan, 1949-1980 (Alan P.L.
$3.00
Liu) 55 pp.
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$2.50
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ISSN
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rence W. Beer) 35 pp.
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Chinese Law and Justice: Trends Over Three Decades (Hungdah Chiu)
39 pp.
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ISSN 0730-0107

ISBN 0-942182-52-9

Disarmament and Civilian Control in Japan: A Constitutional Dilemma
$2.00
(Theodore McNelly) 16 pp.
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Trouble Over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Seabed Boundary Delimi$10.00
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(Hardcover edition published in Maryland Studies in East Asian Law and Politics Series, No.4 ISBN 0-942182-63-4)
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Maryland School of Law. The views expressed in each book reflect only those of the author. All books published in hard cover
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2. Hungdah Chiu, Agreements of the People's Republic of China, 19661980: A Calendar. New York: Praeger Publishers, A Division of
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Forthcoming
Ying-jeou Ma, Trouble Over Oily Waters: Legal Problems of Sea/Jed
Boundary Delimitation in the East China Sea. Baltimore: University
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(ISBN No.: 0-942182-63-4)
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Hungdah Chiu and Shao-chuan Leng, editors, China: 70 Years After
the 1911 Hsin-hai Revolution. Charlottesville, Virginia: University
Press of Virginia, 1984. About 400 pp.
(Published under the co-auspices of the Committee on Asian Studies, University of Virginia.)
ISBN No. and price not yet available.
Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao
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1984. 295 pp.
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ISBN No. and price not yet available.
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